cat." 7 The line's dramatic utility and poetic force depend on its literal sense.
To make vivid what he means by the tyrant's part, Bottom in this line conjures the murderous dismemberment of a semi-domesticated household creature, one whose state of being Shylock (himself "a stranger cur" in Venice) would amplify as "a harmless necessary cat." 8 As we will see, to be both harmless and necessary is to be an innocent presence and an integral part. No "out-law," the harmless, necessary cat is neither a threat nor an alien. Bottom's association of questions of justice and political malfeasance with the little, liminal, literal cat suggests the stakes of thinking historically about the species dimensions of membership, not to mention the definitions of harmlessness and murder that depend on it. It asks us to hesitate before construing every textual animal as an overwhelmingly figurative artifact of human imaginative authority-as though everything we represent were wholly humanized thereby (through projection, anthropomorphism, allegory, and so on) and as though "the human" had sufficient categorical integrity and inevitability to achieve a total conversion of all things to itself. It requires us to resist any reflexive confinement of animal significance within the minor literary category of "animal imagery."
This chapter unearths the broader intellectual foundations for Bottom's passing suggestion that, in their relations with humans, early modern animals could be understood as the subjects of tyranny-the most abiding concern across sixteenth-and early seventeenth-century political thought (alongside obedience, to which animals have a special relation, as we will see).
It also explores what this understanding might teach us generally about the evolving terms and conditions of membership or belonging within a domain of governance as those criteria expand and contract (p.32) in Western discourses. 9 I am not (or at least not necessarily) conceiving of membership as a group of beings consciously committed to the shared principles of a voluntary social order. Such an Enlightenment ideal of consensual or contractarian democracy now seems a point of nostalgia just considering humans among themselves. Consent, externalized in transparent verbal expression, remains a critical forensic standard among humans. But because we no longer understand it as actually descriptive of an origin for human political life, our horizons for thought are ill served by continuing to wield the litmus of consent against of "civic" or stakeholding politics in the name of technologized (bio)management of human "life," repeats with a vengeance what a previous transition had already accomplished for nonhumans. Among the backfired colonizations of late modernity, in other words, humans, too, enter the categorical abyss of "livestock" first created for quadrupeds. But before these two recalibrations-one ending any glimmer of animal stakeholdership, the other commodifying human citizens as "docile bodies"-the language of explicit political relation suffused a frame that was at once larger and smaller than the modern state: the more intimate cosmos of early modernity.
Into the beginning of the seventeenth century, as for centuries before, this constitutional frame derives overwhelmingly from the establishments described in the first chapters of Genesis, as the passages from Gesner and Du Bartas so clearly show. The broad "multidisciplinary" impact of its hexameral verses in particular (accounting for the six days of creation) cannot be overstated. Enjoying overwhelming currency as the account that begins "in the beginning"-and that in a culture that saw itself in a custodial or genealogical relation to that beginning-Genesis touched all spheres of learning. The Hexameron also specifically instanced natural history writing because it explained the diversity of creaturely life while setting forth the legitimate relations among natural kinds. Because early modern animals were understood to have their genealogical progeni-tors listed in its charter (just as early modern humans saw their ancestors (p.36) there), the creatures of Genesis 1 represent animals as animals for the purpose of reflecting on their divine origin and our due relations with them. In other words, classifying them as "imagery" entirely misses their import as natural-historical-here, literal-animals. With effects that were integral to its theological traction, then, early modern Genesis also represented a founding document in the political sense and an origin story in the naturalhistorical sense.
Stemming mainly from intellectual traditions of book learning (rather than empiricism), classically derived natural history in early modern contexts operated less as a narrative about origins and more as a catch-all of recorded knowledge, ancient and modern. In Latin and in vernacular translations, Pliny's encyclopedic Historia naturalis dominated the natural-historical scene, and writers harvested some of their most memorable animal notions from its treasury. Pliny relayed the popular idea that "bievers… gueld themselves, when they see… they are… in danger of the hunters: as knowing full well, that chased they bee for their genetoires." He also conveys the conceit that bears lick their cubs into shape: at "first, they seeme to be a lump of white flesh without all form, little bigger than rattons, without eies, & wanting haire; only there is some shew and apparance of claws that put forth. This rude lumpe, with licking they fashion by little & little into some shape" (a proposition perhaps due to the relative nearsightedness typical of humans) 16 Along with astronomy and geography, the Historia treated "the wonderfull shapes of men in diverse countries"; it catalogued "land creatures, and their kinds," "all fishes, and creatures of the water," "flying fouls and birds," and "insects" (each a section), and also pharmacology, mining and minerals, and painting, sculpture, and architecture. Pliny and his imitators swept from the stars to the elements with a comprehensive eclecticism governed more by attention to scale than by chronology or plot. Nicholas Jardine and Emma Spary describe natural history as a kind of "universal discipline," one that shared with "civil and sacred history in the revelation of the workings of divine providence." 17 More particularly, its bursting storehouse of information (p.37) perfectly complemented the Hexameron's extreme economy of detail, and so it proved readily assimilable to the powerful narrative structure Genesis provided.
The very scope of natural-historical concern (whether we call its ho-lism uni-or multidisciplinary) infused and amplified divine and hexameral writing in early modernity. Du the sequence laid out in the Genesis story. 18 Following Pliny, for example, Du Bartas gives priority among creation's beasts to the elephant, thus inserting a creature not mentioned in scripture but privileged as Pliny's first entry among the land animals:
Of all the Beasts which thou this day did'st build, … I see (as vice-Roy of their brutish Band) The Elephant, the Vaunt-guard doth commaund: Worthie that Office.
Illustrating his awareness of sixteenth-century "news" in natural history as well, Du Bartas records two notorious discoveries at sea:
The Mytred Bishop, and the Cowled Fryer: Whereof, Examples but a few yeeres since, Were shown the Norwayes and the Polonian Prince.
For Du Bartas, all of natural history's accumulating detail belongs in this divine story of creation: "Thear's not any part / In this great Frame" he will omit. 19 In a sermon preached The Law's First Subjects: Animal Stakeholders, Human Tyranny, and the Political Life of Early Modern Genesis before Charles I in 1629, John Donne highlights just such a constitutional, natural-historical Genesis: "Never such a frame… set up as this… for… it is the whole world."
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(p.38) Across the domains of early modern knowledge, the "great Frame" of Genesis provided a common discourse about how things were ruled. The "whole world" ranged from elements to angels. But for animals in particular, one consequence of this hexameral approach was that a political conception of animal membership and even entitlement presented no insurmountable logical conundrum (as debates about animal rights now seem to do, deriving awkwardly from "human rights"). For in addition to the political language of sovereigns and subjects, animals are repeatedly reckoned in terms that sound more ethnographic than taxonomic. The trio of original locales so central to Genesis's account of creation and so important in itemizing the plenary set of living creatures-the seas/waters, the heavens/air, and the field/earth-engendered a sense of proper domains or rightfully assigned spaces specific to different creaturely kinds.
The way Genesis refers to birds, fishes, and beasts each being "of" one of these domains yields a set of subjurisdictions arrayed beneath the monarchy of man. Indeed, the repeated phrasings about animals multiplying "in their kind" suggest not only that there would be a reproductive "keeping to kind" but also that each "race" of creatures would multiply in the sympathetic element proper to its body. Considering why creatures were formed from specific domains, Du Bartas opines that this served so that "each creature might… / Part-sympathize with his owne He likewise refers to "the skalie Legions / That dumbly dwell in stormie water-Regions" (fishes), the "fethered fingers… that haunt the De-sarts," and the land creatures, or "stubborn droves" who inhabit "shadie Groves." 22 Repeatedly the locale or domain of the three major kinds appears as proper to them. Indeed, Philip Sidney's translation of Psalm 8:6-9 ("Thou hast made him to have dominion in the workes of thine hands.… All sheepe and oxen: yea, and the beastes of the fielde: The foules of the (p.39) ayre, and the fish of the sea, and that which passeth through the paths of the seas") markedly registers this sense of animal subjurisdictional claims. artifacts of Creation in a shared status that is, at once, both contingent and stakeholding-the classic ambivalence inherent in the structure of the political subject as such.
Genesis 1 not only blesses all creatures by exhorting them to be fruitful and multiply. It also explicitly accords all created beings a common entitlement to plants as food. In the words of the Geneva Bible (1560), "God said, Behold, I have given unto you every herbe bearing sede… & everie tre, wherein is the frute of a tre bearing sede: that shall be to you for meat." Immediately on the heels of this grant to humans, the grant to other creatures is described as the same: "Likewise to everie beast of the earth, and everie foule of the heaven, & to everie thing that crepeth and moveth upon the earth which hathe life in it selfe, everie grene herbe shalbe for meat." 30 One grant is made to mankind as addressee and the other in the third person, but the speech act the text claims to record characterizes "everie thing that moveth" as likewise entitled. If we consider vulnerability to being devoured as "meat," a more primal divide than the one separating man from beast distinguishes "everie thing that moveth" from plants. Chapter 2 will detail how animal locomotion persistently disturbs their corralling inside the fixed category of either fodder or objects. But while an observer such as Martin Luther could pose the question, "Whereunto serve the raven and crows, but to call upon the Lord who nourishes them?" and thus accord animals their part in the service of God, as we have seen in the introduction the Cartesian paradigm will deprive animals of any residual claim to stakeholdership by revising Genesis and reclassifying animals as unentitled things, whether as "meat" or "machines." 31 Genesis's first charter thus fashions plants as commodity-like consumable (p.42) things for human and animal use, but animals are placed in a political relation with humans as the herbentitled subjects of human "rule." Indeed, when he dubs animals our "Fellow-commoners" in his introduction to Edward Topsell's The Historie of Foure-footed Beastes, John Rowland reflects this sense of a specifically scriptural entitlement and measures its consequences in political terms: "Next unto Man are these Creatures rankt in dignity, and they were ordained by God to live upon the same earth, and to be Fellow-commoners with Man; having all the Plants and
Vegetables appointed them for their food as well as Man had." 32 The mutual right to plants established in Genesis casts animals and people as "Fellow-commoners" as an inclusive matter of rank and dignity, the very terms used to calibrate authorities among people. The opening line of Genesis's second chapter, which begins the seventh day, retrospectively gathers these grassfed creatures as a "hoste": "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, & all the hoste of them" (Gen. 2:1). The Geneva Bible, with its prolific annotations, glosses this host as "the innumerable abundance of creatures in heave[n] & earth."
Referencing the arrangement of kinds that Genesis initially records, this chapter assesses the dynamics within its "hoste" to argue that early moderns read Genesis historically-not just in terms of human history but also in terms of natural history. They conceived cross-species relations by scriptural lights and as a result understood those relations in much more political and constitutional terms than we now conventionally do. As is evident in Latour's elucidation of "the modern constitution" (in which "the scientific power [is] charged with representing things and the political power charged with representing subjects," as we have seen) or even in the exclusively human idea familiar in British studies as "the unwritten constitution," constitutional analysis is not limited to narrowly contractual arrangements. 33 Constitutions are not always on paper. At the same time, we need not be especially metaphorical or abstract regarding the 34 These inscribed principles of governance enshrine a far more textual and legal sense of the world as an unfolding of "divers and peculiar" but connate nature(s) inscribed in bodies by a lawgiver.
The life and motions of the world were described not by physics or numerical principles, but instead by a profoundly textualist sense of law as written in things and continually emerging through their actions. Animals presented a unique situation among the rest of creation. Interaction with them, however "unreasonable" they were officially said to be, had led the observant to note their tendencies to recalcitrance, will, resistance, and prerogative. Their mobility and normal physical freedom highlighted this. Although elsewhere he defends a human power over the inclinations set within things themselves, in construing the suggestion in Romans 8:19-22 that creatures, too, await deliverance with hope, John Calvin calls on this sense of natural law. "Since there is no reason in [mute] creatures, their will is to be taken… for their natural inclination, according to which the whole nature of things tends to its own preservation and perfection," he writes, adding that "in the sad disorder which followed the fall of Adam, the whole machinery of the world would have instantly become deranged, and all its parts would have failed had not some hidden strength supported them." 35 Listing each item of the cosmos, the Edwardine Homily on Obedience (1547) likewise describes how creatures jointly and severally "kepe their ordre," "keepe them in their ordre," and "kepe their comely course and ordre," configuring natural law as a dispersal (p.44) of agency and autonomy. 36 In the same vein, Richard Hooker's magisterial Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593) asserts that God's "commanding those things to be which are, and to be in such sort as they are, to keep that tenure and course which they do, importeth the establishment of nature's law." 37 There are scattered microsovereignties and dispersed capacities in the lawful cosmic framework of the sixteenth century. Echoing Lupton's description of creaturely "emergence," each has its own proper law (the law of its nature), which is a "course" it is said to "keep" by its own inclination. The meaningfulness of "following" or "obeying" a law, of course, incorporates not only the power of not following but the sense of "accord" Du Bartas indexed.
Usage in these contexts shows how "law" indicated a less anthropocentric and much vaster phenomenon than that plenary set of enactments in a human jurisdiction that the term now usually denotes. Meanwhile, human-enacted laws suggested a compensatory adaptation to humanity's fallen state and a limping imitation of the divine model. Vigorous debates about the relations among natural, civil, and canon law, of course, would concern thinkers of all stripes throughout this period. More broadly, however, for the purpose of considering the interface between law and species, two key attributes of natural law stand out. Its priority in time and its unlimited applicability or global reach both highlight the local and transient quality of laws that are (merely) the "inventions" of a humbler humanity. Reflecting the premodern importance of The canonist Gratian's twelfth-century assimilation of Roman law to Christian doctrines had also emphasized a law prior to human law and ranked above it, asserting that "all ordinances are either divine or human" and that "Divine ordinances are determined by nature, human ordinances by usages; and thus the latter vary since different things please different people" (here we see why human law is variable and therefore inferior in kind); the glossator of Gratian's Decretum indicates, further, that natural law thus defined "possesses the greatest antiquity and dignity." 40 St. German evidences the same confidence in a law before and apart from the human. Defining the "Law Eternal," he avows that "it is well called the first, for it was before all other laws and all other laws be derived of it." 41 Human laws, then, were held to be weaker derivatives of something larger that was dispersed among creatures and persistently named as the law's original. As Cynthia Herrup puts this comparative circumspection about human government, the need for it was considered "a consequence of humanity's fall from grace," because "Christian theorists had for centuries agreed that a holy commonwealth would have no need of externally imposed discipline [;] [k]ingship was the best form of government because (p.46) it was the simplest, but monarchy was still only the best of a bad lot." 42 James I, in Basilikon Doron (1599), sharply distinguishes "betwixt the expresse commandement and will of God in his word, and the invention or ordinance of man," cautioning his heir against the overgeneration of new laws. 43 Because statutory enactments and positive law were "human inventions" that only imitated prior, more durable, and more sweeping cosmic laws, their human authorship positioned human laws as the lowest-ranked iteration of lawfulness. A human origin, in other words, was no special virtue in a law.
Its consideration of lawfulness as not exclusively human but as a characteristic of animals too marks the zootopian quality of the premodern constitution; it sets law apart from a narrowly human sense of language and into the wills, bodies, and actions of all "creatures." Beyond distributed lawfulness of this sort, creaturely capacities for signification in general associate animals, law, and legibility in perhaps a more familiar way. From a broad historical standpoint concerning the alleged humanness of language and signifying capability, the highly durable "two books" tradition aligned the 44 Topsell's book on quadrupeds even claims that this living textual material should be "preferred before the Chronicles and records of al ages made by men." With no experience of extinction, he distinguishes creaturely life as permanently relevant compared to the merely accidental nature of human history: "This History… sheweth that Chronicle which was made by God himselfe, every living beast being a word, every kind being a sentence, and all of them together a large history… which was, which is, which shall continue… yet to the world's end." 45 Indeed, for
Topsell, a clergyman himself, natural history had such a divine pedigree that "no man ought rather to publish this unto the World, then a Divine or Preacher." 46 Literalized in the biblical injunction to "aske now the beasts, and they shall teach thee, and the foules of the heaven, and they shall tell thee" (Job 12:7), the scriptural fabric of natural thought generally accorded signifying power to all parts of creation and not uniquely to humans. For figures such as Topsell, the study of nature would even take the human race forward in a project where "confused Babels tongues are againe reduced to their significant Dialects." 47 Brutish human gibberish could be improved by the study of a coherence evident in animals. Meaning, then, was no monopoly of human speech; it certainly did not depend on the Babel of our fallen languages.
As Peter Harrison has described, the lingering "hieroglyphic conception of nature" marking the "two books" tradition locates sixteenth and early seventeenth-century natural history largely within the sphere of "humane learning," where "the elucidation of the natural world… called for an interpretive, rather than a classificatory or mathematical, science" and where interpretation led away from "naked words to the infinitely more eloquent things of nature" to which human language referred. 48 This (p.48) textually framed, legible cosmos would be superseded in the seventeenth century in a transition that James Bono has concisely termed a passage "from symbolic exegesis to deinscriptive hermeneutics" (emphasizing, for example, Galileo's "advocacy of mathematics as the proper language of na-ture") 49 Against this conceived eloquence of nature, according to the eyewitness account of Nicholas Fontaine (1625-1709), the Cartesians at Port Royal "administered beatings to dogs with perfect indifference, and made fun of those who pitied the creatures as if they felt pain. They said the animals were clocks; that the cries they emitted when struck were only the noise of a little spring that had been touched, but that the No creaking hinges or squeaky gears, these creatures participate in the cosmos, taking the part of articulate witnesses.
Due to the convergence of natural-historical material and the Christian theology by which it was read, to treat creation's animals and their descendants as emblems, allegories, animal imagery, or topoi-that is, literary/poetic projections of exclusively human meanings-would be to miss the preoccupations of early modern thought. As we have seen in the introduction, Haraway challenges Lévi-Strauss's anthropological notion that "animals are good to think with" for its investigative and intellectual limitedness. Arguing against the species myopia that would make animals no more than "an alibi" for human themes, she insists on a less exclusively human account. Animals "are not just here [for us] to think with," but have an earthly tenure glaringly similar to our own, a tenure that was especially (p.50) vivid for writers steeped in a hexameral narrative. 55 John Berger, analyzing a historic break in cross-species relations, argued that "before this rupture, animals constituted the first circle of what surrounded man. Perhaps that already suggests too great a distance. They were with man at the centre of his world." 56 Topsell's language literally verifies perspective, animal proximity and participation signified as much as their categorical difference (let alone binary opposi-tion); a "hoste" of creatures partake in a remembered creation.
Reading by the lights of Genesis, animals-obviously-were there at the beginning. They were even "here first," as we say in human contexts of imperial and colonial conquest. Although priority in time can be trumped by other rationales, it ranks as one of the most powerful principles in ethico-legal debates that weigh competing interests. Rowland stresses it in his introduction to Topsell: "Next unto man in dignity," he notes, animals "have obtained one priviledge beyond us, in that they were created before man was." 58 As the close readers of the Renaissance and Reformation well knew, Genesis unveils an articulated procession of animal kinds, each given form from the elements that had just been separated into earth and water, which themselves were fashioned from a world that was "without forme & voyde" (Gen. 1:1). Man comes last in the series. First of all the creatures, from the waters on the fifth day, "everie creping thing" arises (the Geneva Bible glosses them marginally as "fish and wormes whiche slide, swimme, or crepe"); then come "the great whales"; and then "everie fethered fowle." On the sixth day, "the beast[s] of the earth" are created, "the cattel," and "everie creping thing of the earth," and then "[f]urthermore… man" (Gen. 1:20-26; italics added). Genesis then places all preceding creatures under the newcomer's responsibility and governance, allowing humans to "rule over the fish of the sea, and over the foule of the heaven, and over the beastes, & and over all the earth, and over everie thing that crepeth & moveth on the earth" (Gen. 1:26). (p.51) Once installed in Eden, Adam is tasked to "dresse it and kepe it." The Geneva gloss explains this charge as a prevention of idleness, "thogh as yet there was no nede to labour" (Gen. 2:15, k). This represents the sole textual elaboration of what prelapsarian human "rule" entails.
The Fall "of man" affects everybody, including animal bystanders to human sin. For animals, the great change manifests itself as a transformation in the kind of dominion they endure. We could read this broad impact as some commentators do: as proof that animals (and indeed the entire material world) are mere stage properties for an exclusively human moral drama. Calvin, for example, anticipates certain objections to such a reading. Commenting on Hosea 4:3 and instancing again the tripartite realms of creaturely life, he argues that "the Prophet here enlarges on the greatness of God's wrath; for he includes even the innocent beasts and the birds of heaven, yea, the fishes of the sea.… But some one may… object… that it is unworthy of God to be angry with miserable creatures, which deserve no such treatment: for why should God be angry with fishes and beasts?" He counters this objection by answering that because "beasts, and birds, and fishes, and, in a word, all other things, have been created for the use of men, it is no wonder that God should extend the tokens of his curse to all creatures, above and below, when his purpose is to punish men." 59 At stake in reading the political valences of the Christian doctrine of Creation is the fact thatagainst emerging seventeenth-century technoscience and the grain of most discourses of politics -pre-Cartesian thought very commonly accorded certain forms of stakeholdership to animals.
Throughout The Devine Weekes, for example, Du Bartas calls animals citizens, burghers, and people: God "peopled this large Theater / With living Creatures," with "Sea-Citizens" or "the people of the water" and with the earthy "slimie Burgers of this Earthly ball." 62 This is not to say that early moderns ranked animals as equals. They were constantly dubbed "unreasonable creatures." 63 But, in certain tallies, the creatureliness mattered more than the alleged unreasonableness. The scripturally influenced reckoning I am tracing classifies animals as the law's first subjects and the first plaintiff-victims of tyrannical oppression. Against this backdrop, contemporary habits of abjecting animals as "outside the law" derive from (p.53) a more recent human-exceptionalist model of symbolic language. This model cancels animal membership even as it romanticizes their so-called freedom from the law. A fundamentally modern sense of "the animal" as humanity's persistent, solitary, ontological opposite derives from a mode of thought whose trajectory may be said to end with a suggestion in Derrida's The Animal That Therefore I Am. To deconstruct the confinement of "the animal," he writes, would "be a matter… perhaps of acceding to a thinking, however fabulous and chimerical… that thinks the absence of the name and of the word… as something other than a privation." 64 That major sentence, however oblique its formulation, is the closest approach philosophy (postmodern or otherwise) makes to the premodern, natural-historical, and scripturally informed vision of a zootopian constitution, where the possession of animated and cognizable interests is not yet the monopolistic property of a more singularized humanity.
Instead-partly because humans have never so mastered meaning that they could exclude the nonhuman from their signifying acts, partly because the idea that signification is exclusively human depends on the rise of technoscience in the seventeenth century, and partly because at times we have aimed to speak of them-with the early modern descendants of Genesis we "really" are talking about those we now group under the collective English noun "animals." In the aftermath of technoscience and the Enlightenment, we have preferred our textual animals "fabulous and chi-merical," as fables, symbols, "animal imagery," or any other confinement we Man is by nature… more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals.… Man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust. 66 Note how Aristotle's account of animal "voice" contravenes the framework supporting the idea that they "cry without pain." Man's being relatively "more" of a political animal than bees and "other gregarious animals" might be seen to concede a measure of politicity to animals. The force of Aristotle's argument here, however, continues in the opposite direction, asserting the rhetorical "power of speech" over those mere voicings and "intimations" of meaning relayed among animals. As Descartes would do later, Aristotle works backward from the general comprehensibility of human speech to other humans (i.e., communication within species), to (p. 55) the assertion of political capacity in humans, to a denial of it in animals. Animals have no language, the disjointed argument goes, because we fail to understand them. The animal political potential that is denied in this mode of analysis, of course, could never be demonstrated across species in the absence of a shared denominator of translation or comprehensibility (the unavailability of which Montaigne blamed as much on us as on them) 67 Thomas Aquinas further bolts the door: "When we hear it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us." 68 Animals lack rational fellowship with us, so it follows that the obligations of the Ten Commandments cannot pertain. Hobbes, too, invokes his considerable expertise on contract to explain that "to make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible;
The the idea that beasts were outside the law had no force at the cosmographic level from which ideas of human "law" derived, as we have seen.
From Aristotle to Aquinas, to Hobbes, to Agamben, and even to Levinas, we see an echo of the popular human opinion, philosophical and exceptionalist in nature, that there is a capacity possessed exclusively by humans called politicity and that is manifested directly through the consent mechanism of a functioning symbolic language that animals can be said to lackalthough few contemporary commentators sustain a faith in the efficacy or transparency of language when considering it for other purposes. As Keith Thomas has observed, "Official attitudes" normally express an "uncompromisingly aggressive view of man's place in the natural world," while actual practices were more ambiguous and scatter in several directions. 72 Even within human acts of representation, diverse signifying imperatives persistently undermine more direct, "official" proclamations. This, in part, is why a literary-historical inquiry yields a different account of human and animal relations than the philosophical tradition.
Against the official chorus of human denials both philosophical and mundane, Genesis establishes a sequence of fundamentally political relations between humans and animals: good governance or stewardship, obedience, and then a new adversity triggered by human transgression of divine law. The asymmetrical degeneration of human/animal relations stems from human sin. As Calvin reflects, "It is indeed meet for us to consider what a dreadful curse we have deserved, since all created things, in themselves blameless, undergo punishment for our sins; for it has not happened through their own fault that they are liable to corruption. Thus the condemnation of mankind is imprinted… on all creatures." 73 Those clearly blameless, Calvin emphasizes, incur liability without fault; in another context, as we have seen, he stresses their guiltless condition as "innocent beasts." Because this handling of "punishment" contradicts the fundamental logic of justice, for a host of writers human-exceptionalist (p.57) theological rationales are insufficient to put this justice problem to rest. This context shows how notions of "animal innocence" derive not just from some rising sense of wild freedom from culture or law that develops with industrialization or from their infantilization in the Disney World of contemporary commodity culture. Instead, "animal innocence" derives from its legal and biblical sense at this pivotal moment in biblical mythography. As Calvin points out here (and as Donne later echoes), when it comes to sin, animals must be found not guilty-yet they still bear the burden of its penalties. As we will see, this problem is recognized as a political one, with the dramatic result that Renaissance assessments of human/animal relations readily turn to rich period vocabularies for the critique of political tyranny.
The The first stage of these relations-humankind's duly established, benevolent government-is brief. Calvin says of the "authority" first granted to man that God "appointed man, it is true, lord of the world; but he expressly subjects the animals to him, because they having an inclination or instinct of their own, seem to be less under authority from without." 74 As we have already seen, Gesner likewise registered this particular distinction for animal estate as uniquely "vassalaged" in the domain of human governance. Genesis's second chapter records an alternative temporal sequence. Adam appears for the first time. Contradicting the earlier affirmation that "he created them male and female" (Gen. 1:27), God muses, "It is not good that the man shulde be him selfe alone: I wil make him an helpe mete," and so he proceeds to form "of the earth everie beast of the field, and everie foule of the heaven These two variant accounts in Genesis, despite certain discrepancies, make up a first stage, one in which animals are subject to the benign and duly authorized power/knowledge of man, exercised in a nonviolent vegetarian domain with visions of companionate "helpe" across species.
The second stage is all too familiar, though a few notes will complicate it, species-wise. Of that speaking snake, we learn that "the Serpent was more subtil than anie beast of the field," (Gen. 3:1). But ambiguity enters immediately, and the Geneva glosses suggest that the snake did not act independently, but as an instrument. "As Satan ca[n] change him selfe into (p.59) an Angel of light, so did he abuse the wisdome of the serpent to deceave man," and "God suffered Satan to make the serpent his instrument and to speake in him" (Gen. 3:1, a, b; italics added). The serpent possesses a "wisdome" that is capable of being abused, but his speech, though Eve seems unsurprised by it, is attributed to Satan. Godly interrogation quickly exposes Adam and Eve's misstep. But the first subject cursed is the serpent, and in this we also hear the included curse of all creatures: "Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattel, and above everie beast of the field"; the Geneva gloss further proposes that God gives Adam and Eve a chance to repent, but "not the serpe[n]t, because he wolde shewe him no mercie" (Gen. 3:14, m). The ark reunites the "hoste" of "living creatures" under completely non-Edenic conditions. In the Geneva translation, the repeating phrases "all flesh," "everie living thing," and even "everie thing in whose nostrels the spirit of life did breathe" unify the class of beings-human and animal alike-to be "destroyed" by drowning in the waters of the Deluge (p.60) (Gen. 6-8 passim; 7:22). Again, an unresolved question about the application of justice appears: if the Flood revenges widespread human corruption, why eradicate all the host of creatures? The Geneva gloss addresses this obviously persistent question of the scope of punishment-again, in a gloss without gloss. It simply marvels that here "God declareth how much he detesteth sinne, seeing the punishment thereof exte[n]deth to the brute beasts" (Gen. 6:7, h). This annotation implicitly acknowledges that the justice delivered seems out of measure.
While some celebrate the preservation of species representatives in the ark as evidence of an equal concern for mankind and animals, how then do we evaluate the new regime for which they are saved? For while Noah's people go on to reconquer the world, the estate of animal survivors of the Deluge appreciably worsens. First, a "feare" and "dread" of humans is placed on them: "The feare of you, and the dread of you shalbe upon everie beast of the earth, and upon everie foule of the heaven… & upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand are thei delivered." Next, in a literal conversion of animals to fodder, God licenses human carnivorousness for the first time:
"Everie thing that moveth & liveth, shalbe meat for you: as the grene herbe, have I given you all things" (Gen. 9:2-3; italics added). This extreme alteration seems justly to reflect Shakespeare's poetic measure (in The Tempest) of suffering a "sea change" (1.2.404).
In the original dispensation, mankind was granted rule over animals-with the express mandate of a vegetarian diet for all. 79 First, all creatures (p.61) were witnesses and messengers of God's glory, subject to Adam as Adam was subject to God; after the Deluge, their flesh, not just their fealty, is conscripted to relatively weaker or nondoctrinal rationales such as human convenience, comfort, or necessity. Calvin argues that "men may render animals subservient to their own convenience, and may apply them to various uses, according to their wishes and necessities."
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The Geneva gloss alleges likewise that "by this permission man may with a good conscience use the creatures of God for his necessitie" (Gen. 9:3, c). These rationales track precisely with the way a tyrant tramples his subjects' rights and subordinates them to private desires. Thomas Smith's 1583 treatise on government is typical when it asserts that the tyrant "hath no regard to the wealth of his people, but seeketh onely… to satisfie his vicious and cruell appetite." 81 How does the situation deteriorate so that the consumption of animals enters the arrangement? The shift Genesis narrates follows the politically familiar course of benign rule turned to enmity, of stewardship or care converted to predation-paradigmatically indexing the perversions of tyranny. Martin Luther's commentary on this pivotal transition uses staggeringly political vocabulary. After the flood, animals endure what he calls "a more oppressive form of bondage," and humans exercise "a more extensive and oppressive dominion" because "animals are subjected to man as to a tyrant who has absolute power over life and death." 82 Indeed, construing Romans 8:18-22, Luther ascribes a firm power of legitimate complaint to all creatures, affirming that "on the last day all creatures will utter an accusing cry against the ungodly who have shown (p.62) them abuse here on earth, and will call them tyrants to whom they were unjustly subjected." 83 Oppression, bondage, dominion, unjust subjection, and tyranny:
without necessarily suggesting an earthly remedy for this sorry state of affairs, words such as these rate the animal condition in the sharpest available terms of human political evaluation.
The new dispensation after the Flood thus becomes a flashpoint for puzzling or rationalization. Luther observes, "Until now the animals did not have to die… to provide food for man," for until then "man was a gentle master of the beasts rather than their slayer or consumer." 84 As Calvin points out, the infusions of animal "feare" and "dread" after the Deluge assure that "sovereignty over the rest of animals might remain with men"; in setting up an order of things after the Flood, only a new godly endowment can ensure "that the same dominion shall continue." 85 As
Luther stresses, however, that original benevolent dominion involved no hunting, killing, or taming, and we have no continuous dominion with Adam's: in "that first dominion… there was no need of skill or cunning.… Therefore we retain the name and word 'dominion' as a bare title, but the substance itself has been almost entirely lost." 86 In Du Bartas's formulation, animals were politically obedient "without command" in that "first dominion." Effectively acknowledging the shakiness of this transition in human sovereignty, even Calvin wonders, "Since we perversely exalt ourselves against God, why should not the beasts rise up against us?" 87 We have already seen Du Bartas warn how "Rebellious Adam, from his God revolting, / Findes his yerst-subjects 'gainst himselfe insulting," and Donne likewise would ask, directing his apostrophe to the horse, the bull, and the boar in Holy Sonnet 12, "Why brook'st thou… subjection?" 88 Among the Reformers, Luther appears attuned to animal claims, and Calvin is more invested in a freer scope for human dominion. But for both, (p.63) the Reformation's own complex relation to political authority fuels the commentary around this ominous biblical conversion. The discourse of tyranny makes the tyrant a devourer: he "bloodieth his handes with the slaughter of innocents," and their blood he "devoureth up with his unclean mouth." 89 According to the chronology of Genesis, in just this way animals literally become meat for their sovereign. plants as "meat." Instead, he suggests that those who infer Edenic vegetarianism from the passage have insufficient reasons, questioning whether humans were really vegetarian until the Deluge. "Since the first men offered sacrifices from their flocks" and "were clothed in skins," he concludes-against those who might say flesh eating was then "unlawful"-that "it will be better for us to assert nothing of this matter." 90 He resumes the debate more assertively, though, in connection with the express permission to eat meat granted in Genesis 9:3 on the ark's return to land. Rejecting the simplest inference that licit meat eating begins when scripture makes it licit, he claims not to "see what obligation should prevent… the eating of flesh," which he then repeatedly refers to as a "liberty" that "we must firmly retain." 91 Calvin is
challenging Catholic ideas about fasting here, but he so firmly defends this "liberty" to eat meat that he, like the traditional practices he indicts, must leave textual warrant behind to do so.
While Calvin overreaches on this point, Luther entertains a different possibility. Using blunt language in the Lectures on Genesis 6-14 about (p.64) God ("in this passage God sets himself up as a butcher"), he stresses elsewhere the superiority of the original dispensation: "I am sure Adam, before his fall, never wanted to eat a partridge; but the deluge spoiled all. It follows not, that because God created all things, we must eat of all things. Fruits were created chiefly as food for people and for beasts; the latter were created to the end we should laud and praise
God." 92 Indeed, Luther appears especially cognizant of the possibilities inhering in animals'
intended worldly presence. With a dateline of "Wittenberg, 1534," he composed a quasi-legal document titled "Complaint of the Birds to Luther against Wolfgang." Drafted in the voice of songbirds ("we thrushes, blackbirds, finches, linnets, goldfinches, and all other pious, honorable birds") who faced capture by one of Luther's servants, the letter protests how one Wolfgang violates the domain rights entailed in Genesis and "undertakes to rob us of the freedom God gave us to fly through the air." As we have already seen, Sidney would call the bird a "freeburgess of the air." The "pious, honorable" birds of Wittenberg go on to point out that a more just approach would direct Wolfgang's "wrath and industry agains sparrows, swallows, crows, ravens, mice, and rats… [who] do you much harm, rob and steal corn, oats, and barley." 93 Echoing in words the exquisite animal portraits of his contemporary, Albrecht Dürer ( fig. 1.2 ),
Luther further declares in his Lectures on Genesis 1-5 that "the mouse, too, is a divine creature. … It has a very beautiful form-such pretty feet and such delicate hair that it is clear that it was created by the word of God with a definite plan in view. Therefore here, too, we admire God's creation and workman-ship. The same thing may be said about flies." 94 The here-and-now facticity of observed animals grounds their privilege and divine appointment, and their presence as such warrants a spiritual attention.
When it came to the eschaton, Calvin argued (presumably without irony and applying his favored metaphors of animal control to human in-quiry) that "some subtle men, but hardly 96 Even the curse on the serpent will be reversed when venom is no more. Luther's moral gauge of "harmlessness" stands out as he figures the eschaton as a place of reestablished animal participation, undoing their worldly disenfranchisement under the tyrannical regime of fallen man. Not just witnesses at the "last day" (though that in itself affirms a politically significant capacity to testify), they also inhabit his vision of restored life.
Bestiae contra Tyrannos: Sidney's "Ister Bank"
For early moderns thinking about political relations gone wrong, "butchering" and "devouring" those for whom one has an affirmative duty of care were persistent hallmarks of tyranny. Christopher Marlowe's Edward II is called "a tyrant" and "a butcher… / Unnatural king, to slaughter noble-men and cherish flatterers"; Shakespeare's Macbeth likewise is dubbed "an untitled tyrant, bloody scepter'd," whom poetic justice reduces to a "dead butcher" by play's end. 97 Tyrannized human subjects have been "turned into beasts" or placed "under the yoke" of tyranny. Yokes, bits, collars, reins, whips, traps, nets, and so on -the instruments of animal controlappear throughout the metaphorics of tyranny. In an extended elaboration, Ponet's Short Treatise (1556) blisteringly compares the tyrant's behavior toward his subjects to human behavior toward animals:
As an huntour maketh wilde beastes his praie, and useth toiles, nettes, snares, trappes, dogges, firrettes, mynyng and digging the grounde, (p.67) gunnes, bowes, speares, and all other instrumentes, engynes, devises, subtilties and means,… so dothe a wicked governour make the people his game and praye, and useth all kindes of subtleties, deceates, craftes, policies, force, violence, crueltie, and suche like devillishe wayes, to spoyle and destroyethe the people, that be committed to his charge.… [He fains] uniust causes to cast them in to prison, wher like as the bearewardes mosell the beares, and tye them to the stakes,… so he keepeth them in chaines, whilest the bishoppes and his other tormen-tours… doo teare and devoure them. Animals "in the pulpit" literalize the exhortation in Job 12:7 urging humans to get good teaching from the beasts. They demonstrate their knowledge of freedom. There is rich ambiguity as to how much the animals cry out "Long live Liberty!" to inspire tyrannized human subjects by their example and how much they do it to defy tyrannical humans in their own acts of politically disobedient resistance.
Calvin had suggested that human dominion manifests itself in "the fact that oxen become accustomed to bear the yoke," that "the wildness of horses" can be subdued, "that cows give milk," and that "sheep are mute under the hands of the shearer." 102 But referring to horses, Erasmus's Folly registers an entirely different view, stressing "the sharp-toothed bit, pricking spurs, prison-like stable, whips, bridle, rider, the whole tragedy of the voluntary servitude the horse chose to undergo." 103 Likewise, the republican La Boétie invokes natural history to claim that the elephant breaks off its own tusks "as a ransom for his liberty," and he stresses how much work is required to subdue a horse: "He is tamed with such difficulty that when we begin to break him in he bites the bit, he rears at the touch of the spur, as if to show… that, if he obeys, he does so not of his own free will but under constraint." La Boétie even offers his own verse to conclude the passage: "The oxen under the weight of the yoke complain, / And the birds in their cage lament." 104 At stake here is the vitality of animals as political subjects in themselves and not just didactic fables for humans. Across a range of writings inflected by Genesis as a natural-historical and legal-theological precedent, the terms and conditions of human sovereignty over real animals operate as an example of tyranny-not just an emblem for it.
After a European sojourn among such Protestant advocates in the (p.69) 1570s, when his celebrated association with the Huguenot Hubert Languet arose, Philip Sidney wrote his prose romance, the Arcadia (written by 1580 and published in 1590). The Arcadia is steeped in the commitments of Sidney's political vision, and at its center, in the only instance where it refers to an actual person, Sidney placed a verse naming Languet as its source. 105 The poem, "On Ister melancholy Jacques in As You Like It, begins "upon the ground at the foote of a cypresse tree, in so deep a melancholy" that the others try to rouse him. "Ister Bank" has been repeatedly called a "beast fable" by commentators concerned with Sidney's political investments, a fable warning of the tyrannical potential inherent in the monarchical form of government. 106 But, as we'll see, Sidney's original reworking of the creation story in conjunction with another key Bible passage politically and intellectually goes beyond his more fabulous sources.
In the poem's archaic diction, the verse opens "on Ister bank," the ancient name of the Danube, suggesting the Viennese locales where Sidney and Languet associated. 107 Philisides situates himself and his flock at nightfall, which prompts him to rehearse his fiduciary care for them and sing "lest stray they should" (line 21). But his song, he says, was Languet's. Three stanzas name "old Languet /… the shepherd best swift Ister knew" as Sidney's teacher:
With old true tales he wont mine ears to fill:
How shepherds did of yore, how now, they thrive, Spoiling their flock, or while twixt them they strive. Pivoting on the moral force of harmlessness, Sidney presents a "harmless empire" among animals and before humans-a functioning beastly polity-that presents a noninjurious, working order. No human sin had engendered animal venom in this "hurtless" world. Sidney's aristocratic perspective, we may suppose, leads him to suggest that those "beasts with courage clad" governed, operating like no less a body than the senate of republican Rome.
Wavering about the causes of ensuing political change in the animal world-perhaps the animals without "courage" envied those who had the power courage accrued, or perhaps "they all to changing did incline"-Philisides reports that The idea that subjects serve the convenience, pleasure, and comfort of the sovereign, of course, reflects a tyrant's presumption (and also rationales supporting meat eating). Those familiar with political debates about the legitimacy of resistance to kings will immediately recognize the source of this story and its unfolding details from chapter 8 of the first book of Samuel (to which we will return momentarily). There, the Israelites ask Samuel to "make us nowe a King to judge us like all nations." Samuel and God read this desire as a rejection of right rule. There follows a rushing inventory of harms and predations; the king will take everything his subjects have and make them his servants (1 Sam. 8:11-17).
Sidney's poem next reverses the Prometheus myth, in which all available attributes were given to animals, leading Prometheus to give humans practical wisdom and fire instead. 108 In acquiescing to the animals' request, Sidney's Jove asks each to contribute something to this new creature, man. Reading "Ister Bank" deconstructively as a "fable not about politics but about being human," Erica Fudge underscores the fact that all of man's attributes are animal contributions to suggest how much "Sidney's man is… more animal than the animals themselves." 109 Philisides lists twenty-nine such gifts explicitly and gestures to more. The animals offer a range of qualities, positive and negative. The lion, the elephant, the fox, the eagle, the wolf, the ant, and the chameleon donate just what we still know to expect from them. But other, less familiar gifts also appear: from the mole, "a working thought"; from the monkey, "sweet breath"; from the cow, "fair eyes"; and from the cat, melancholy. The crocodile gives its tears, the ape its hand (lines 78-97). Last, in a revision of Aristotle on animal speech, their passion to be ruled (a voluntary servitude gone wrong) leads the animals foolishly to agree "that from henceforth to all eternity, / No beast should freely speak, but only" man (lines .
In telling what happens next, Sidney inventories the injuries typifying any slide into tyrannical government, just as they had been itemized (p.72) in Samuel. At first, wily man, "fellow-like, let[s] his dominion slide" (line 110). Once he sees that the animals depend on him, "then 'gan he factions in the beasts to breed," tricking them into violent behavior for which he conveniently executes them in sham actions of justice, as Ponet envisioned (line 120). After man suborns the services of a few and controls them with bits and collars, the transition from kingship to tyranny reaches its inevitable, bloody, and carnivorous conclusion-man's choice to play "a part to tear a cat in":
Worst fell to smallest birds, and meanest herd, In this evocation of human meat-eating as tearing and bruising, Sidney exploits the opening provided by the relatively weak rationales licensing carnivorousness after the Flood, likening those rationales to the frivolity widely associated with "bloody sport" in the period and linking postlapsarian, carnivorous human dominion to moral certainties about the predations of a tyrant as a cynical butcher and devourer of his people.
The penultimate stanza addresses the two parties to this sad story, the tyrant and his victims, gluttonous man and "poor beasts." "O man," the verse instructs, rage not beyond thy need; Deem it no gloire to swell in tyranny. Thou art of blood; joy not to make things bleed. Thou fearest death; think they are loathe to die. A plaint of guiltless hurt doth pierce the sky.
(lines 148-52)
"Guiltless hurt" sounds the note of paradox at the heart of the justice problem Genesis encodes; man's innocent subjects are despoiled by human tyranny's incapacity for restraint. The poem ends when morning comes, and contention breaks out among Philisides's auditors over what was meant by the song. The oldest shepherd condemns its engagement (p.73) with political topics as a breach of pastoral decorum, saying that "he never saw thing worse proportioned than to bring in a tale of he knew not what beasts at such a banquet when rather some song of love, or matter of joyful melody, was to be brought forth," and he quickly changes the subject from those who may be on the table.
What Sidney has crafted here is no beast fable-if by "beast fable" we mean an allegory of speaking animals who personate human moral failings and so indict the follies of humans as such or among themselves. What we find here does something more. Sidney's story of human/ animal relations offers a political account in which beasts, as beasts, play an essential role in the generation of meaning, just as "man" stands for man; they do not simply stand in for something else with their animal capacities suspended or subdued. "Ister Bank" certainly invokes Aesop's Samuel-like story of the naïve frogs who beg Jove to give them a king. In that classic beast fable, Jove first casts down a log for them (which they discover is not a "real" king). When they insist on a real one, Jove sends them a large stork who proceeds to devour them (figs. 1.3. and 1.4). savagery. Sidney's animals look like the animals of Genesis rather than those of Aesop; they are more natural-historical than emblematic; they are parties to the story. After all, if man's dominion over "real" animals were morally neutral, this entire "fable" would, as they say, lack teeth.
The thrust of the passage in Samuel, of course, is to deny any right of proceeding against a tyrant. An admonition warns the Israelites, "Ye shall crie out at that day, because of your King, whom ye have chosen you, and the Lord will not heare you at that day" (1 Sam. If we were to conjure the absent entry for humans in the encyclopedia of animals, or compose an early modern profile in kind following natural-historical models, such testimonies to irrational cruelty would rival claims for rationality as humanity's signature. Calling man "the greatest tyrant in the world" in his Divine Considerations of the Soule (1608), Nicholas Breton presses the point: "What Butcher can more cruelly teare in peeces the limmes of a beast, then one man in his malice will the very heart of another?" 113 A tendency to moral catastrophe indelibly marks human beings as such, not just the tyrants among them.
And sixteenth-century animals seem to know all about it. Among the several animal complaint poems added by George Gascoigne to his translation of The Noble Arte of Venerie or Hunting (1576), one in particular-"The Otter's Oration"-concentrates on the species politics of meat and the morality of "devouring" it. 114 The otter was long the target of campaigns for elimination as a rival hunter of fish stocks in rivers; Isaak Walton's The Compleat Angler (1653), for example, claims that "the Otter devours much fish, and kills and spoils much more than he eats." 115 Topsell calls otters "dogs of the water" and "very biting Beast[s]"; he marvels how they can smell "fishes in the waters a mile or two off," but notes how many drown in fishnets for their "greediness of fishes." 116 Topsell's portrait, following Gesner's, shows an otter "very bitingly" eating a fish; Gascoigne's does the same ( fig. 1.5 ). But Gascoigne's otter rebuts these "slandrous" charges of excessive consumption "for which we Beastes be slayne" and reverses it against "all Adams seede"-returning to the benchmark of Genesis for leverage. While Gascoigne's otter stresses the bloodymindedness of man as a devourer, his other animal complainants press the justice-oriented terms of harmlessness and murder with which we began. The hare refers to itself as "a harmelesse thing" and a "silly harmelesse Hare," chastising at the same time the "bloudie minde of Man" and characterizing humans as "murdrying men" who have a taste for "murder." 118 The "harmelesse hart" complains of "nets and instruments," suggesting a perverse human pleasure (p.78) in animal suffering. While the hart accepts both "fear" and "dread" as the political terms of the dispensation after the Flood, it questions why "play[ing] the man" means "killyng harmelesse Deare." Instead, the hart interprets Genesis to require only such sacrifices as are naturally cast from its body: "Such hornes, such heare, suche teares as I have tolde, / I mew and cast for man's avayle." Considering man's "murdryng cruell minde," the hart asks, "Canst thou in death take suche delight? breedes pleasure so in paynes?" An assessment of disproportionate greed and in-satiate appetite leads the hart to pray that man's tyrannical cruelty will rebound on itself:
Lo here I crave of mightie Gods, whiche are bothe good and just: That Mars may reygne with Man, that stryfe and cruell warre, May set mans murdrying minde on worke, with many a bloudy Jarre.
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Violence and strife within kind appear to be mankind's most singular property.
In the sixteenth century, two elements define tyranny. The tyrant either displays a cruel violence that violates his fiduciary charge, or he usurps another's place (quite often we find both) 120 Like
Erasmus, Luther, Gascoigne, and Breton, Montaigne too charges humanity, as a species, with both aspects of this crime. In "Of Cruelty" he writes that those who are "bloodie-minded towards harmlesse beasts, witnesse a naturall propen-sion unto crueltie," which he glosses paradoxically as nothing less than a human "instinct to inhumanitie." He notes how "no man taketh delight to see wild beasts… make much one of another: Yet all are pleased to see them tugge, mangle, and enterteare one another." 121 Referencing the justice problem of "harmeless beasts" that figured in readings of Genesis and specifically according meaning to our shared hexameral origin, Montaigne continues that "considering that one selfe-same master (I mean that incomprehensible worlds-framer) hath placed all creatures in this his wondrous palace for his service, and that they, as well as we, are of his household: I say it hath some reason to injoyne us to shew some respect (p.79) and affection towards them." Indeed, he confesses that when one considers the "neere resemblance betweene us and beasts, and what share they have in our greatest privileges, and with how much likely-hood they are compared unto us," one can no longer assert "that imaginary soveraigntie that some give and ascribe unto us above all other creatures." 122 Recalling Luther's sense of postlapsarian human dominion as reduced in moral stature to a "bare title" and Sidney's hubristic mankind claiming dominion over even the unknown, Montaigne's "imaginary soveraigntie" brings mankind lower, as a fraud.
We have seen that in those locales of reading where the resources supplied by Genesis are in play, animals appear as the subjects of the law who then become the abjects of tyrannical man and his greedy seizure of "imaginary soveraigntie." A wide range of thinkers call mankind a tyrant in relation to nonhumans. Early modern political logic invokes these animals not exclusively as metaphors for human folly, suffering, and political oppression by means of the techniques of the beast fable or prosopoetic talking animals. Instead-under the auspices of Genesis as the governing account of first foundations and as typological history-these animals signify as political subjects. They are conceived to be capable of meaningful (i.e., willing) obedience and vulnerable to wrongful dispossession and likely to rise in a legitimate rebellion that La Boétie and Sidney cast as exemplary.
My conclusion returns to Shakespeare. Numerous passages reflect the interconnected issues of harmlessness, animal entitlement or liberty, and human violence at stake in this reading of Genesis. In Titus Andronicus, for example, when young Marcus kills a "poor, harmless fly" who "with his pretty buzzing melody / Came here to make us merry," Titus cries, "Out on thee, murderer! thou kill'st my heart." Amplifying the murder charge, he describes his eyes as "cloyed with view of tyranny," which he glosses in turn as "a deed of death done on the "Murder" applies outside of kind, and acts of human tyranny take place across species.
We have already explored the significance of the fact that the word "animal" appears only 8 times in Shakespeare, whereas together the words "beast" and "creature" occur 268 times. Three of these eight "animals" inhabit the woods of As You Like It, with two of them in a single scene. In act 2, the exiled duke contemplates the woods to imagine a reversal of the Genesis narrative we have been considering: "Here feel we not the penalty of Adam" (a proposition undermined immediately by his reference to the "sweet" uses of adversity) (2.1.5). When he then proposes "shall we go and kill us venison?" he immediately indexes a concern:
And yet it irks me the poor dappled fools, Being native burghers of this desert city, Should, in their own confines with forkèd heads Have their round haunches gored. (2.1. [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] These "native burghers" echo other creaturely reckonings of citizenship: Du Bartas's "SeaCitizens" and "Burgers of this Earthly ball" and Sidney's "free-burgess of the air." The duke's interlocutor in the scene, a lord, reports that one of their companions-the melancholy Jacquesgrieves at that, And in that kind swears you do more usurp Than doth your brother that hath banished you. (2.1. [26] [27] [28] The lord recounts Jacques's response to a wounded deer, a "poor seques-tered stag" described as a Here we see the specific dilemma Genesis bequeaths to quadrupeds: despite the notion of distinct and assigned animal domains in the sea, in the air, and in the field, those of four-footed estate must share a land-based life with us, to their particular harm. Hexameral writing in the Renaissance handles this glitch in domains largely by dividing land-living creatures into humans and those populating spaces where humans are absent, hence the repeated references to "deserts" in Du Bartas and Sidney. The seeming oxymoron, then, of Shakespeare's "desert city" captures the way that animals are not so easily and simply understood as outside of polity or as unpolitical.
As the woodland dialogue continues, we hear more about Jacques's musings. Assignment refers to the domain rights we have seen Genesis establish, and the sense of heirship and inheritance in Shakespeare's repetition of "native" compounds the rightfulness of the deer's claim. Jacques's tears and moralizing on the spectacle of the deer surely serve as fodder for word-play in the scene, but in fact they only extend the duke's own first remark that something uncomfortable, or irksome, inheres in the thought of killing deer-here called "fat and greasy citizens" (2.1.55)-in a domain that is legitimately "theirs." There is something "bloodie-minded" about it. Here, we are not in Agamben's Athens, where it makes "no sense" to speak of a zoë politikë. We are in Arden, a place populated by citizen-creatures whose unhonored entitlements persist in forms sufficient to irk or trouble interloping bipeds. In terms of Renaissance political theory, it would be very hard to say "what's worse" than a usurper or tyrant. It appears it must be "man." Arden is not Athens; neither is it Eden. Even so, the literally melancholic trace of Edenic arrangements across kinds lingers as a sort of species memory in Arden, where the bloody tyrant-perhaps to our surprise-is us.
Notes:
(1) . Virginia Woolf dubs such Shakespearean echoes "queer jingles" in "Twelfth Night at the Old 
